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I
t is a pleasure to be in Sydney today to participate in this meeting 
and to offer my perspectives on some of the recent events in finan-
cial markets and their implications for financial stability. Over the 
past three decades, we have experienced an increased number of finan-
cial crises in many countries around the world. These crises have taken 
place in many different parts of the financial system, including: banking 
and payments systems, housing finance systems, securities markets, and 
currency markets. Central banks and other authorities charged with 
maintaining financial stability have drawn important lessons from each 
of these crises and have instituted regulatory and policy changes that 
have helped strengthen the financial system in the wake of these crises. 
Indeed, forums like this meeting are extremely helpful in providing a 
venue for discussion of these crises and possible policy responses. 
Despite our best efforts, much like a virus responds to the body’s 
immune system defenses, financial crises have continued to return in 
modified form, requiring ongoing vigilance by policymakers. More-
over, the task of maintaining financial stability has become more diffi-
cult over time because of the changing structure of the financial system. 
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As you may know, many countries are in the process of shifting from 
a bank-based system of financial intermediation to a capital markets-
based system. The pace of change has risen as well, with many new 
financial products and many new players in the financial landscape. In 
addition, the intermediation process has become increasingly complex, 
posing difficulties both for market participants and policymakers. And, 
with the increased global linkages among financial markets, disruptions 
in one market may spread quickly around the world.
Unfortunately,  we  have  not  adapted  our  regulatory  and  policy 
framework at the same speed as financial market developments. Our 
main regulatory and supervisory policies and our central bank liquidity 
facilities are best positioned to deal with traditional banking crises and 
appear less adequate to deal with crises that increasingly originate in 
financial markets and outside the banking system.
In my remarks today, I would like to use the recent subprime mort-
gage crisis to motivate a broader discussion of how we can maintain   
financial stability in a changing financial system. While the recent crisis 
has revealed some new and unexpected vulnerabilities in the financial 
system, it has also highlighted the need to remember some of the lessons 
we have learned from past crises—as indicated by the title of my speech.
I.  Recent evolutIon of the fInancIal SyStem
Let me begin my discussion with some general comments on the 
sweeping changes we are seeing in financial systems around the world. 
The key development in this changing framework is the evolution from 
a  bank-based  system  of  financial  intermediation  to  a  market-based 
system. Banks retain an important but increasingly different role in   
financial intermediation. For the larger banking organizations, activi-
ties and earnings are now focused more on loan originations and credit 
risk management services, and less on holding loans on the balance 
sheet to generate interest income. 
While some of these developments may be further along in the 
United States, similar trends are evident throughout the world. In this 
new system, investors can be very far removed from borrowers, relying 
on a number of agents to ensure the smooth functioning of the system. 
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financial instruments and claims pass through many hands and often 
wind up far from their origins.   
Several factors are behind these dramatic changes in the financial 
framework. One key factor is the enormous growth in the amount of 
funds managed by large institutional investors such as pension and mu-
tual funds. Equally important are technological innovations in infor-
mation processing and telecommunications. The significance of these 
innovations can be seen in the greatly expanded access to timely finan-
cial information by investors and institutions, the substantial reduction 
in the cost of gathering and processing such data, and the unimpeded 
flow of information and communications around the world. 
Accompanying these developments are advances in financial the-
ory, which have made it possible for market participants to develop 
mathematical models to price a wide variety of new financial instru-
ments. This financial engineering is also allowing banks and others to 
break up the payment flows on debt obligations and partition them 
into a wide array of risk tranches, thus allowing firms and investors to 
actively manage their risk exposures and select the level of risk they are 
willing to incur.       
The rising importance of market-based finance is leading to several 
significant changes in the banking industry. With lending for their own 
portfolios declining in importance, banks are expanding their operations 
in other areas, including trading, market making, investment banking, 
and risk management products for themselves and others. And while the 
banking industry is still the largest holder of credit market obligations 
in the United States, this lending has moved away from large corporate 
lending and now includes more credit card and real estate construction 
lending, and loan origination and securitization activities. 
This changing loan focus, in part, reflects the increased availability of 
information in financial markets and the efficiencies in using these mar-
kets. At the same time, the regulatory and supervisory framework is shap-
ing what banks can do. For example, regulation and capital requirements 
may be making it too costly for banks to hold high-quality assets on the 
balance sheet and to compete directly in certain market segments.
One important consequence of these changes in financial structure 
is that we have seen an evolution in the nature and location of financial 
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outside of the banking system. In fact, the name most commonly as-
cribed to recent events has been “market turmoil.”  Another character-
istic of recent events and crises is that they have spread across countries 
and, in many cases, through surprising and unexpected linkages. These 
developments have raised new challenges for policymakers about how 
the effects of these crises can be contained and whether conventional 
policy tools will provide the most desirable and effective response. But, 
they also raise new concerns about moral hazard.
II.  a conceptual fRamewoRk
Before I talk more specifically about the recent subprime mortgage 
crisis and its ramifications, it may be helpful to review the key factors 
that underpin the functioning of the financial system and the need for 
policy intervention to maintain financial stability. At a very basic level, 
financial intermediation, whether bank-centered or market-centered, 
requires overcoming asymmetric information and agency problems. 
And, financial intermediation has associated externalities that provide 
an important role for public policy.  
Traditional methods of overcoming problems of asymmetric infor-
mation include: establishing long-term relationships with borrowers, 
requiring specific equity or capital levels to be maintained, requiring 
collateral in support of a loan, imposing restrictions on a borrower’s 
activities and use of loan proceeds, and asking for third-party guaran-
tees of loan contract performance. Fundamentally, the shift of interme-
diation from banks to markets can be understood in terms of markets 
gaining access to more information on which to base their funding 
decisions and having the tools, such as credit scoring, to use this infor-
mation efficiently.
Agency problems also complicate the intermediation process when 
the incentives of agents are not aligned well with the principles they 
represent. In a bank-based system of intermediation, banks serve to in-
ternalize many of these agency problems. In the new market-based sys-
tem of finance, the growing complexity of the intermediation process 
and the increasing number of players that are involved in intermediated 
transactions are leaving investors, savers, and borrowers much more de-
pendent on the actions and advice of others, many of whom may have 
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may play a role in destabilizing parts of the intermediation process and, 
more generally, the financial system.
Finally, the financial system exhibits important externalities that 
can lead to a market failure and require public intervention to address 
or realign the focus of market participants. Moreover, given the inter-
connected nature of financial markets and payments systems—both on 
a domestic and an international level  —the shocks or breakdowns in 
one sector caused by externalities can be readily transmitted to other 
sectors, thereby having systemic implications.
The presence of externalities justifies a strong role for public policy 
in maintaining and improving the efficiency and stability of the finan-
cial system. At a micro or institutional level, these policies include stan-
dard setting, regulation, and supervision. But there are also connections 
at the macro level where overall macroeconomic stability can promote 
financial stability and where financial instability can affect and impair 
macroeconomic performance.
As we step back and look at the recent subprime crisis, I find it very 
helpful to frame my thoughts in terms of these issues. For example, my 
take on the recent subprime crisis is that the mechanisms that have been 
developed to overcome asymmetric information and agency problems 
in financial markets are much less robust than we may have thought. 
In  the  case  of  externalities,  my  sense  is  that  our  traditional  policy   
approaches, which are designed for a bank-based financial system, may 
not be as well-suited to our new, market-based financial system. 
III.  a cloSeR look at Recent eventS
With these ideas providing a frame of reference, I would now like 
to take a closer look at the recent U.S. subprime mortgage crisis and 
its ramifications for the financial system. Rather than providing a de-
tailed discussion of the evolution of the crisis, which has been well-
documented by others, I would like to highlight three areas that I be-
lieve policymakers should focus on as we try to strengthen the financial 
system in response to these developments.
Liquidity strains
While the root of the subprime crisis lies in traditional concerns 
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cus on the severe liquidity strains that enveloped financial markets and 
which continue, to some extent, even today. As you may know, much of 
U.S. mortgage finance in recent years has flowed through institutions 
outside of the depository system and outside of the formal bank super-
visory and regulatory process. Many of these institutions behaved like 
traditional depository institutions in borrowing short and lending long. 
With no deposit base, these institutions obtained funding in short-term 
money markets using asset-backed commercial paper. 
When concerns about subprime credit quality heightened over the 
summer, investors ran for cover. Those institutions without backup 
lines of credit were forced to sell assets, typically at a large loss, and a 
number were liquidated. Those institutions with backup lines of credit 
with banks were, in many but not all cases, able to obtain funding. 
However, banks were not well-positioned to meet these demands, and 
their funding requirements placed enormous strains on money mar-
kets in Europe and the United States. And, as you know, these funding 
pressures necessitated massive amounts of reserve provision by central 
banks through open market operations and lending facilities.
In many respects, these are events we have seen before in periods 
of banking crises. What is new is that the initial problems are arising 
in institutions outside of our regulatory and supervisory purview and 
without direct access to traditional elements of the safety net—deposit 
insurance and access to central bank lender-of-last-resort facilities.
Moreover, the problems are spilling over very quickly into the bank-
ing system. In addition to direct exposure through lines of credit, banks 
have taken an active role in setting up some of these off-balance-sheet 
entities and may be holding similar securities in their investment and 
trading portfolios.
But there is another new dimension to liquidity that has raised the 
ante in coping with financial crises. As we have shifted from a bank-
based system to a market system of finance, the functioning of markets 
in periods of crisis has become critical. Beginning with the U.S. stock 
market crash in 1987; then in the Asian, Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment, and international debt crisis in 1997-98; and now in the subprime 
mortgage crisis, we have seen repeated instances in which markets have 
seized up and ceased to function, just when they are most needed. This 
poses serious problems for those financial institutions that do not have adequate portfolio liquidity and rely on markets to obtain liquidity. In 
addition, without well-functioning markets to establish prices for secu-
rities, it becomes extremely difficult to do the valuation exercises that 
are required by our mark-to-market accounting systems.
Asset valuation 
Indeed, the difficulty in valuing assets in the recent crisis raises a 
second serious concern about our increased reliance on asset valuation 
models. These models require good data on the credit experience and 
volatilities of the underlying assets. But, they also require good judg-
ment in their application. The subprime crisis has revealed appalling 
weaknesses in both regards. Subprime loans do not have a very long 
history, and their recent history is somewhat deceptive because many 
were made in a period of rapidly rising house prices. Thus, valuation 
of these loans relied very heavily on a judgmental bet that the benign 
market conditions of recent years would continue. In addition, valua-
tion exercises did not appear to make sufficient distinctions between 
types of mortgage contracts offered to subprime borrowers. A fixed-
rate, 80 percent loan-to-value ratio loan is a very different product from 
a variable-rate, 100 percent loan-to-value loan even if they are made to 
subprime borrowers with the same credit score.
I do not think these valuation problems are confined to assets backed 
by subprime loans. Indeed, they are likely to be very pervasive across asset 
classes because of the benign financial conditions of recent years and the 
proliferation of nonstandard terms in contracts and bond covenants.
Problems in asymmetric information
A third issue that I would like to focus on is weaknesses that have 
been exposed in financial markets mechanisms for overcoming asym-
metric information and agency problems. As I noted earlier, the phe-
nomenal growth of financial markets in recent decades is largely a result 
of the development of methods to get around these problems.
In particular, credit ratings have become extremely important in 
supporting the growth in asset-backed lending. Why else would inves-
tors around the world buy assets backed by loans to U.S. borrowers 
with low credit ratings?  Until a few months ago, investors viewed credit 
ratings on privately issued mortgage-backed securities as almost equiva-
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lent to the implicit government guarantees on GSE-backed securities. 
Many investors have now discovered the difference between an opinion 
and a guarantee.
Because credit ratings play such an important role in the function-
ing of markets and in Basel II standards, I believe it is extremely impor-
tant to understand what went wrong. Despite the self-serving responses 
of some of the rating agencies, I believe there are some very serious is-
sues to be addressed. One important issue is the incentive conflict that 
arises because the agencies receive compensation from the companies 
who are obtaining the ratings. Another issue is the models used by the 
agencies to rate structured securities and the judgment used in the rat-
ing process. 
As an example, consider a recent story by Allan Sloan in Fortune 
magazine. According to Sloan, a mortgage trust assembled by a promi-
nent investment bank had a portfolio of second mortgage loans that 
had essentially no borrower equity and had little or no documentation 
on more than half the loans. Amazingly, 93 percent of the tranches were 
rated investment grade by the two main credit-rating agencies. As of 
September, 18 percent of the loans had defaulted, wiping out many of 
the lower-rated tranches.
Another lesson that markets have “relearned” from recent events 
is the importance of equity in disciplining behavior. Many of the sub-
prime loans made in recent years contained very low homeowner eq-
uity. Moreover, as the example above indicates, much of the so-called 
equity in these loans was in fact borrowed from other lenders through 
a second mortgage. With no equity and with interest rate resets re-
quiring much higher payments, the viability of these loans depended 
almost entirely on rapid appreciation in house prices. Of course, issues 
of excessive leverage in financial markets are not confined to subprime 
mortgage lending. 
There are similar incentive problems in the mortgage loan origina-
tion process, much of which now occurs outside the regulated bank-
ing system. Mortgage brokers, realtors, and appraisers make money 
through the volume of transactions, but bear little or no responsibility 
for the quality of the loans that are made. 
Of course, the same incentive problems for borrowers and interme-
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years, supervision, regulation, and banks’ own risk management and 
corporate governance practices have provided important checks and 
balances on these incentive problems. Unfortunately, our new market-
based system of finance does not appear to have addressed these incen-
tive issues appropriately or in a very robust manner.
Iv.  polIcy challengeS
I would like to close my remarks today with a brief look at some 
of the policy issues that have been raised by these recent events. I will 
touch briefly on four topics: liquidity issues, information and disclo-
sure, incentive problems, and moral hazard concerns.
Liquidity issues
Providing liquidity to the financial system in times of stress is, of 
course, a primary responsibility of central banks. However, because 
central bank liquidity facilities are generally directed toward the bank-
ing system, it is less clear whether the traditional liquidity facilities are 
well-positioned to meet liquidity pressures that emerge from outside 
the banking system. As a case in point, the Federal Reserve’s discount 
window facility was not used as much as we might have liked in the 
recent crisis. Part of the difficulty was the historical stigma issue that has 
caused banks to be reluctant to use the window, part was the relatively 
high price of discount window credit, and part was a unique feature of 
the current crisis in which pressures were concentrated in term fund-
ing rather than overnight funding. While the Federal Reserve made a 
number of temporary modifications to discount procedures to try to 
enhance the window’s effectiveness, a broader rethinking of the struc-
ture of lending facilities may be in order. As part of this exercise, it may 
be useful to consider whether lending facilities should be accessible to a 
broader range of institutions than has been the case historically.
A broader question regarding liquidity is who should be respon-
sible for providing it: institutions or central banks?  In recent years, the 
U.S. banking system has seen a decline in on-balance-sheet liquidity as 
banks have relied more on liability management and purchased funds. 
The reasons are obvious: As markets have grown, they have provided 
increased liquidity in normal times, and the provision of a liquidity 
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examine how to improve central banks’ methods for providing liquid-
ity, perhaps we should also consider whether the banking system should 
play a larger role as well.
The second type of liquidity issue that I mentioned earlier, market 
liquidity, is a more complex issue. I really believe that we need to focus 
more attention on research into the microstructure of financial mar-
kets to understand why liquidity pressures develop and why markets 
seize up in times of crisis. Until we have this understanding, we will be 
forced to deal with these pressures indirectly via the banking system.
disclosure of information
In much of the commentary on recent events, there has been a 
considerable emphasis on additional disclosure of information to help 
financial market participants make better decisions. While I have been 
a long-time advocate of greater disclosure, especially in the banking sys-
tem, I wonder whether these concerns are somewhat misplaced. In this 
new information age, we have plenty of information. For many of the 
more complex structured products that have been developed in recent 
years, it is possible to obtain most of the underlying data needed to ana-
lyze the products. In a sense, the real problem may be that we have so 
much information that, combined with the complexity of the financial 
products, investors cannot possibly make appropriate risk assessments 
without relying on other agents. Even sophisticated analysts, such as 
the rating agencies, may not be able to do a thorough and complete 
analysis. So, I think the information problems go much deeper than 
suggested by calls for additional disclosure.
Correcting incentive problems
In terms of incentives, I think it is important to ask whether mar-
kets are likely to correct some of the problems themselves or whether 
they will need substantial assistance.
Indeed, there are currently a number of legislative proposals in 
the U.S. Congress designed to address some of these problems. These 
include greater standardization of mortgage products, licensing and 
regulation of mortgage lenders, and requirements that borrowers have 
real equity behind their loans. To be effective, however, some of these 
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Two more difficult problems involve the rating agencies and non-
depository lenders. Given the importance that ratings play both in the 
new structure of financial markets and in Basel II, some reform of the 
credit-rating system is imperative, but the solution is not obvious. In 
the case of nondepository lenders, even though they do not operate 
under explicit safety net protection and bank regulation, their behavior 
does have systemic implications, and they may have ties to larger finan-
cial organizations that are considered too big to fail. While I don’t have 
an answer to whether or how they should be regulated, this is an issue 
that policymakers may have to address in the future.
Moral hazard issues
Finally, with regard to moral hazard issues, there has been a lot of 
talk in the financial media about the implications of policymakers’ re-
sponse to financial crises as creating moral hazard and sowing the seeds 
for future crises. I believe that some of this talk is clearly off the mark in 
the sense that responsible parties are in many cases bearing the fruit of 
their bad decisions. They are not being “bailed out.”
However, there are some deeper issues here that should give us 
concern. First, to the extent that some large, systemically important 
institutions are protected through forbearance or temporary relaxation 
of regulations, policymakers are making decisions about who will bear 
the losses. 
Second, those of you who are familiar with the macroeconomics 
literature are no doubt aware of the relevance of the Lucas Critique to 
these issues. The Lucas Critique informs us that policymakers must be 
aware, and take into account, how their actions affect the expectations 
of market participants. The reason this point is labeled a “critique” is 
that up to the mid-1970s, this style of thinking wasn’t common among 
policymakers. Today, we recognize that if policymakers change their 
behavior, market participants will take this into account and expect 
policymakers to behave similarly in the future.
Thus, there is no doubt in my mind that financial market par-
ticipants have taken note of central bank actions and will factor these 
actions into what they expect in the future. So, in this sense, we must 
recognize that actions that seem appropriate in dealing with the current 
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earlier today and on numerous occasions in the past is “too-big-to-fail.”   
Another is the recent granting of exemptions between bank and finan-
cial affiliates under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act. Please note 
that I am not being critical of changes that policymakers implement in 
times of crises. Indeed, we may find that some temporary changes are 
very necessary, and perhaps some should be made permanent. But such 
actions have consequences. 
In a similar macroeconomic vein, I believe that to the extent policy-
makers respond effectively to financial crises, they do alter the behavior 
of asset prices and default probabilities. Since this information serves as 
the “history” for our asset valuation models, it may become more dif-
ficult to use these models effectively in pricing securities or in conduct-
ing risk-sensitivity simulation exercises.
v.  concluSIonS
In conclusion, let me acknowledge that there are many other im-
portant issues raised by recent events that are beyond the scope of my 
comments. These include how the more widespread implementation 
of Basel II will change the financial landscape that we operate in and 
how recent events may cause us to rethink how we structure capital 
requirements going forward. In any event, I believe we can rest assured 
that financial markets and institutions will continue to evolve so that 
we will likely need to reconvene at a future date to address a new set of 
important policy issues.
  
 